

From peterbra Tue Sep 4 12:05:42 1990
To: joachink
Cc: jeffl richardf
Subject: RE: Competing with Sun
Date: Tue Sep 04 12:05:24 1990

Paulina and I had a call with Mike Clark this morning. Paul and I will meet with Stimac, Perez, Barnes, Clark and maybe Swavely and Canon either this Friday or next Friday.

Purpose will be:

1. Position and market current 386SX to 486 products better. Working with Intel, Compaq and others to better position the 486 against SUN.
2. Review our relationship with SCO and how MS and SCO are going to work to more closely support OEMs like Compaq.
3. Go thru the RISC stuff. Listen to Compaq, and understand them better rather than try to cram some position down their throats.

>From joachink Tue Sep 4 11:58:29 1990
To: billg bobmu bradsi carls jbal jeremybu karenh mikemur nathan
paulina peterbra ralfha richardf russw stevab
Subject: RE: Competing with Sun

Date: Tue Sep 04 11:43:38 1990

Why don't we get a task force going to define what needs to be done short term and long term instead of exchanging more lengthy e-mail? This is getting non productive? comments?

>From carls Mon Sep 3 10:39:18 1990
To: billg bobmu bradsi jbal jeremybu joachink karenh mikemur nathan paulina peterbra ralfha richardf russw stevab
Subject: Competing with Sun.

Date: Mon Sep 3 10:38:51 1990

Nathan, I agree with you 100% that the long-term threat is the technology difference RISC-x86, and the potential for someone to use that to take our mainstream market away. The shorter-term, specific threat is having Sun make inroads into our market in the next 12-18 months, before we really have anything to show.

I believe we need to act to protect our position during those next 18 months, and we need to act with all three key types of players: end users, OEMs and ISVs, as well as Intel. The issue for us is not competing on Sun's tradition turf, but rather keeping them out of our strongholds. It is a fact that both OEMs and Intel see Sun making inroads, and both of these groups want to act. They get confused if what they should do is go after Sun's existing market, or do something to protect their own, but if we guide them appropriately, we can channel

their need to do something in a positive, 486/Windows 3.0-based direction. They want to act we need to give them something to do. In the case of end-users, we just need to show them that we have an alternative to Sun.

The ISVs are probably the hardest, building upon the incredible success of Windows 3.0, 32-bit extensions to that, and a promise to move the that forward are the key things there.

We recognize what we have to do in the long run in moving toward RISC and we should be going 100% for that, but at the same time there are some important tactical steps that must be taken in the short-term, or else our RISC offering will be much less important or relevant if in the meantime half of our OEMs are shipping SPARC machines, and the SPARC machines are an alternate standard at half the Fortune 1000. The short-term work will probably require more of our people—especially

on the sales and marketing side—and involve far more external parties for the next 12 months; for the RISC offering we have to get all of the development work done, get the tools really ready, etc., before it takes

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a high profile—and we are probably best of keeping a low profile for a while.

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